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ABSTRACT
This analytical paper assesses the BP Deepwater
Horizon 2010 oil well explosion in the Gulf of Mexico in
the context of ethical theory in the field of emergency
management. It reviews the relevant literature that
pertains to the ethical dimensions of decision making
in relation to industrial disasters. Once the theoretical
framework is established, a descriptive presentation
of features common to Deepwater Horizon and past oil
disasters is presented. The analysis suggests that the
BP disaster in the Gulf of Mexico was, as much as any-
thing else, the product of a systemic ethical failure on
the part of both the oil industry and public officials. In
addressing this failure, principles consistent with the
theory presented are identified along with some pre-
liminary action steps to stimulate and guide ongoing
discussion and evaluation pertaining to the applica-
tion of ethical theory to the important tasks of risk
reduction and safety.
Key words: ethics, industrial disasters, Deepwater
Horizon
INTRODUCTION
If the past is prologue to the future, the overall
influence of the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion of
2010 on the policy agenda will be muted when com-
pared with a genuinely natural disaster or a national
security crisis. This is primarily because the oil policy
domain is ongoing, its interests are well entrenched
and powerful, and as such it is not usually event
driven.1 There may be some slight policy modifications
or adjustments (improved regulation for safety, a few
more dollars invested in alternative energy sources,
etc), but the future of deepwater drilling and the pol-
icy interests of the oil industry will be impacted only
marginally. This suggests that the prevention of or
mitigation against future disasters of this magnitude
will have to be the product of something else. The
“something else” to be assessed herein is the promo-
tion of ethical standards for the industry and for pub-
lic policy makers that provide more reliable guidelines
for decision makers and a stronger defense for public
safety and natural preservation.
This assessment will begin with a review of rele-
vant literature in the field of emergency management
that addresses the ethical dimensions of decision mak-
ing in the context of industrial disasters. Once we
have articulated the theoretical framework for ethical
responsibility in relation to industrial disasters, the
analysis will turn to a description of features common
to past oil disasters and to the Deepwater Horizon
that exemplify, in the context of the theoretical foun-
dation, ethical failures on the part of both the oil indus-
try and public officials. The analysis will conclude with
the recommendation of principles and some steps that
might logically be explored and implemented to pro-
mote the application of the ethical theory presented to
the important tasks of risk reduction and public
safety.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Industrial disasters are regular occurrences.
Many such disasters have occurred in the oil industry.
Until the spring of 2010, the Exxon Valdez tanker
spill of March 1989 was considered the greatest oil
disaster in the American history. When the Valdez
ruptured her hull on Bligh Reef, she spilled 30 million
gallons of crude (56 percent of her cargo) into Prince
William Sound and left devastation in its wake.
Thousands of marine mammals, thousands of marine
birds, and millions of salmon and herring were among
the victims. The years to follow saw continued threats
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to plant and animal life and revealed a trail of perva-
sive health problems for response workers related to
the use of chemical dispersants in the cleanup phase
and ongoing health risks for the human population.2
As the BP Deepwater Horizon well explosion of
2010 unfolded, releasing as much as two million gal-
lons of crude per day into the Gulf of Mexico, there was
a sense of déjà vu to the narrative. The symbolic power
of an oil spill is undeniable. It is a visible and emo-
tional event that, to the degree it is of a serious mag-
nitude, becomes a focusing event. A focusing event
often presents us with a motivation, and some might
say a duty, to try to place it into a broader perspective
to both better understand it and to take constructive
steps to apply what may be learned from it. It is in this
sense that our understanding and our discussion of
the focusing event known as Deepwater Horizon might
be “broadened” if placed into the context of ethical the-
ory in the field of emergency management and its
application to industrial disasters. Such a broadening
may have utility if it encourages industry leaders and
political policymakers alike to reformulate the man-
ner in which they think about ethics and its applica-
tion to the important tasks of risk reduction and pub-
lic safety.
Corporations and governments acknowledge the
inevitability of major industrial disasters and crises.
They plan for them, try to prevent them, but all too
often fail to really cope with them effectively. Improved
managerial tools and better techniques to prevent and
cope with industrial disasters have long been per-
ceived as necessities in an industrial setting.3
Major industrial disasters may include some or
all of the following characteristics: large-scale and
unprecedented risks; long-term impacts that are diffi-
cult to predict accurately and which expand risks;
standard emergency plans and procedures that prove
inadequate or ineffective; scientific or technological
uncertainty that is severe or potentially paralyzing; a
critical phase that is long and leads to the exhausting
of people, systems, and organizations; a slow and diffi-
cult return of impacted communities to normal; some-
times harsh conflicts within the impacted communi-
ties; and economic, cultural, political, and legal stakes
that can be extremely high.4 Any combination of these
characteristics is likely to be accompanied by a great
deal of situational uncertainty and symbolic manipu-
lation by multiple and competing interests that wish
to expand or contain the policy impact of the disaster.
The causes of major industrial disasters are gen-
erally attributed to rare malfunctions, unforeseen fail-
ures, impossible to anticipate side effects of technolog-
ical systems, or to natural phenomena beyond human
control. However, the reality is somewhat different. In
most cases, a disaster is the result of an interaction of
industrial systems, technologies, people, and environ-
ments that produce a disaster that could have and
perhaps even should have been anticipated.5
Decision makers, private and public, often per-
suade themselves that a disaster is unexpected or
unlikely. Corporate executives and public officials are
often too quick to take the position of minimizing the
risks attached to various technologies and practices.6
Political and economic factors combine to make this an
unfortunate byproduct of technological and economic
development. The assurances and assumptions of cor-
porate and political leaders are rarely subjected to
appropriate rigorous and frank scrutiny when things
that are valued highly come into inevitable conflict
with the value of public safety. Profit, economic devel-
opment, jobs, votes, etc, are such high stakes that they
often skew risk assessments.6 This is not to say that
risks should not be taken or that any enterprise can be
made entirely risk free, but it is to suggest that the
risks inherent in technologies and development prac-
tices should be assessed honestly and should never be
casually minimized even in the pursuit of socially
acceptable or highly valued ends.
One complicating problem with respect to most
industrial disasters is that they are the product of mul-
tiple decisions made by multiple agents that have
cumulative effects. Technological decisions and those
decisions that pertain to technological byproducts are
such that, as a disaster begins to unfold, their cumula-
tive impact may quickly overtake the contributing acts
and motives of their originators. This cumulative effect
may consume what had originally appeared to be a
rational and even ethical basis for judgment by several
different decision makers along the way. In such a con-
text, how does one assess ethical responsibility?
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The emergency management literature speaks of
the need to anticipate the unexpected and to reduce
the risk to life, safety, and property posed by regularly
occurring natural disasters or by hazardous events
stemming from human endeavors that entail ele-
ments of predictable risk.7 The reduction of risk is a
critical mitigating function in emergency manage-
ment. Risk reduction, especially in conjunction with
the value placed on human life and property in Western
societies, is an ethical responsibility widely attributed
to the emergency management function.8 It is gener-
ally understood that managers and decision makers
may be said to have ethical responsibility under a
specified set of conditions:
 They have specific knowledge of and are
able to prevent an emergency or disaster.
 They have an ability to make decisions
and act on them.
 They have a choice to act or not to act.
 Their decisions have value consequences
that affect lives, welfare, and the rights of
other persons.9
Decision makers (public and private) who make
assessments and decisions regarding risks are ethically
responsible for outcomes when they have knowledge of
and are able to prevent a disaster, the ability to make
decisions, a choice to act or not act, and their decisions
have value consequences. It is the first of these condi-
tions, ie, that they have knowledge and are able to pre-
vent a disaster, which deserves special consideration
here and is of critical importance to our discussion.
Policy makers, industrial leaders, and emergency
management specialists presumably operate on the
basis of knowledge about present situations, projected
risks, and possible harms, and they develop responses
that anticipate future outcomes. This requires a pre-
dictive knowledge base; however, predictive capacities
often fall behind the technical knowledge that per-
mits us to act. It has been suggested that this fact, the
possibility of a gap between our ability to act in a
technological sense and our ability to predict, is the
prime moral dilemma presented by technology.10
Narrowing that gap to prevent surprise industrial
disaster is, in addition to being a scientific and prac-
tical necessity, a necessary precondition for ethical
decision making. This is to say that without such
knowledge and its proper application, there is no pos-
sibility for ethical decision making. Whatever its
causes, the lack of a proper knowledge base or a refusal
to act in reference to it will render all decisions arbi-
trary from an ethical point of view. Ethical judg-
ments, uninformed and based solely on the pragmatic
discretion of political and industrial leaders, are no
better than whim or impulse when they are divorced
from reliable predictive knowledge. It is important to
note, however, that the lack of such knowledge is all
too often a matter of choice.
The unavailability of knowledge due to a genuine
inability to develop reliable predictive information is
to be truly confronted with the unknown and the
unpredictable. This inevitably implies a tragic ethical
arbitrariness and a degree of uncertainty that pre-
cludes holding anyone responsible for the genuinely
unknown or unexpected. However, this condition, the
inability to know, is infrequent and rare. More typical
is the unavailability of knowledge due to ignorance.
In this instance, the possibility of knowing exists but
has not been fully developed or pursued. The problem
is correctable and it is, one might say, a moral duty to
narrow the gap between actions and our ability to
predict consequences.10 The third type of unavailabil-
ity with respect to knowledge is what we might call
unavailability by choice. This is the type all too fre-
quently observed. Unavailability by choice is usually
the product of political or economic influences that
lead decision makers to discount, underestimate, or
ignore what is known or knowable in pursuit of what
they perceive to be some greater and more compelling
political or economic value.
To say we could not possibly have known is very
different from saying we could have known but did not.
Far more serious is the situation where we knew but
chose not to act based on what was known. The first
situation is tragic, to be sure, but the second two are at
the heart of most ethical failures by decision makers.8
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Without knowledge we can say that there is no pos-
sibility for ethical choice. It is important to note, how-
ever, that knowledge is a precondition but not a guar-
antee of ethical choice. Knowledge, to the degree that it
may contribute to ethical decision making, must be
placed in the service of broader values. The values typ-
ically referenced in relation to ethical choice in Western
thought include utilitarian rationales, culpability and
prevention of harm standards, the concept of basic
human rights, and public service rationales.11-13
The preferred ethical action from the utilitarian
perspective, for example, is based on its usefulness
in creating the greatest good (economic or material
usually) for the greatest number. The utilitarian
approach has been institutionalized in the public and
private sectors through the implementation of cost-
benefit analysis. For its critics, this approach is faulted
for its willingness to often accept social costs that exceed
social benefits (however defined) for the sake of indi-
vidual gain. The basic human rights perspective, usu-
ally offered as a viable alternative to or adumbration
of cost-benefit analysis, suggests that it is never
acceptable to allow a significant loss of life or vitality
from a public disaster without taking actions to pre-
vent or minimize it simply because such action may
be socially inefficient or incur costs deemed unaccept-
able to industrial or political actors.11
The basic human rights approach is compatible
with the Lockean and widely accepted Western prin-
ciple that life and all other property rights are guar-
anteed and may not be violated or endangered by
governmental or private entities. Personal safety is
considered as a part of these basic rights, and both
the preservation of life and the prevention of harm
figure strongly into every calculation of risk. Risks
are generally prohibited if they meet one or several of
the following conditions:
 The potential harm is physical and may
also be life threatening.
 The potential harm is not reversible.
 The risk of the harm is undetectable in
advance by its potential victims.
 There is avoidable unpredictability.
 Policy and decision makers are able to pre-
dict the risks and harms.
 Reasonable steps may be taken to reduce
the risks or prevent the harms.
 The probability of incurring the harm in a
predictable disaster scenario is high.14,15
Under the conditions set forth in this formula-
tion, the introduction of risk is prohibited. The notion
here is that, under these circumstances, decision mak-
ers have an ethical obligation for the safety of individ-
ual citizens and populations potentially impacted. This
ethical obligation presumes that citizens or impacted
populations cannot perceive or predict a threat to life
or safety and thus are unable to pursue their own best
interests in a disaster scenario. It further presumes that
their well-being and safety depends on the informed
or knowledge-based judgment of others in critical
decision-making roles.
The prevention of harm, the reduction of risk, the
elimination of prohibited risk, and even a basic cost-
benefit analysis all have one thing in common. They
assume the existence of knowledge and a central role
for it in making decisions and in meeting any ethical
standards. The concept of prohibited risk, as briefly
articulated, binds public and industrial leaders
together in serving the values of life and public safety
(or, if thinking strictly along utilitarian lines, in
reducing social costs, maximizing social benefits, etc).
In theory, no decisions may elude the grasp of prohib-
ited risk. However, as we turn to an assessment of
responses by industry and political leaders to oil-
related disasters or incidents, we all see too frequently
that knowledge (the necessary precondition) is not
put to work at risk reduction or safety and the indus-
trial disasters that occur as a result are indeed a part
of a larger and systemic ethical failure. What follows,
given space constraints, is a broad overview of com-
mon behaviors and practices gleaned from several
well-known disaster incidents, including Deepwater
Horizon.
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OIL AND ETHICAL FAILURE: A PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER
The unavailability of knowledge by choice is, as
already noted, often the product of political or eco-
nomic influences that lead decision makers to dis-
count, underestimate, or ignore what is known or
knowable in pursuit of what they perceive to be some
greater and more compelling political or economic
value. The unavailability of knowledge by choice
appears to be a theme common to disaster scenarios
related to the oil industry. Where this condition is
observed, it is the greatest inhibitor of ethical deci-
sion making by industry and political leaders. An
examination of specific cases is instructive.
BP (formerly British Petroleum) has had a his-
tory of ethically questionable (within the theoretical
framework established herein) and illegal behavior
spanning decades. Prior to 2010, the best-known dis-
aster was the 2005 explosion of a refinery in Texas
City (near Galveston) that killed 15 workers, injured
180, and endangered thousands of nearby residents.
A subsequent investigation by the US Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board found organi-
zational safety deficiencies at all levels of the corpora-
tion. BP pleaded guilty to a felony violation of the
Clean Air Act and was fined $50 million.16
In Alaska, more than 20 years ago, BP deficiencies
came to light in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil
tanker spill. Exxon was BP’s partner in Alaska’s
Prudhoe Bay oilfield and shared ownership of the
trans-Alaska pipeline system (Alyeska) that routinely
failed to live up to BP’s promises to contain spills. Its
North Slope Corrosion Control Program, for example,
failed miserably time and again. Despite warnings
from a leak detection system, a corroded piece of
pipeline in Prudhoe Bay lost oil (more than 200,000
gallons) over a 5-day period in March 2006. A second
leak occurred 5 months later (1,000 gallons).
Subsequent investigations by Congress found that the
entire line was riddled with corrosion and that BP
workers were actively discouraged from reporting
safety and/or environmental problems. Other disturb-
ing reports (eg, from 1993 to 1995, a BP contractor had
illegally dumped hazardous materials down well shafts
on the North Slope) were numerous and indicative of a
lax attitude toward safety and the environment.16
After the 2005 Texas City explosion, the US
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
issued a report concluding that BP had a history of
ignoring warning signs, routinely failed to invest in
safety as a means of cost cutting, and pushed their
people to maximize profitability at the expense of
both worker and public safety.16 There is evidence of
some increased safety investments after this 2005
report; however, a corporate culture of cost cutting and
cutting corners on safety is said to have persisted.17
This does not make BP unique among oil companies or
in the corporate world generally. Love Canal (a symbol
of corporate neglect of toxic waste), General Dynamics
(a symbol of defense industry excess), Exxon Valdez (a
symbol of corporate insensitivity to the environment
and to safety), the Savings and Loan scandal of the
1990s (a symbol of banking irresponsibility), and a
long and continuing list of corrupt practices (consider
the current financial crisis) provide ample evidence
that ethics and corporate responsibility in general
requires our constant attention.17 However, BP does
make an interesting case study in relation to the eth-
ical argument being made herein, and thus we turn
our attention more directly to Deepwater Horizon for
purposes of illustration.
The extraction of oil in the Gulf of Mexico has been
common since the end of World War II. Most of the
wells were in shallow water (about 200 feet deep) and,
in the event of a problem or accident, divers could be
sent down to fix them. However, as these inshore
coastal wells became depleted, oil companies went into
deeper waters. Oil companies pushed further offshore
and deeper (5,000 feet beneath the surface in the case
of Deepwater Horizon), and this has expanded risks
and increased safety concerns. Divers cannot fix deep
wells. Robotic instruments are used at deeper levels,
generally with less precision than human divers and
in an environment (ie, different chemistry of the
water) where the fixes that work in shallow water
often do not work.18 The key point here is that as oil
companies have gone to greater extremes to acquire
oil, they have increased the level of risk and the poten-
tial for harm associated with oil exploration.
Congressional hearings conducted in July 2010
concluded that although the oil industry has spent
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billions of dollars to research and develop the tech-
nologies for deepwater drilling, little investment has
been devoted to the technologies for accident preven-
tion and hazard mitigation. In spite of well-known
increased risks and the increased prospect for high-
impact disasters such as Deepwater Horizon, deci-
sions have been made to reduce costs by not investing
in risk reduction and safety.19 This is, in essence, a
choice not to act on the basis of what is known about
risk. However, this is not the only case of “unavailabil-
ity of knowledge by choice” that plagued the Deepwater
Horizon. What we have come to know about the
events of April 20 just prior to the explosion and what
we have come to know of its aftermath point to a
series of choices rendered ethically questionable by
the failure to act on the basis of what was in fact
known. Poor judgment and faulty equipment com-
bined with the unavailability of knowledge by choice
set the stage for a series of ethical failures.
On April 20, 2010, an explosion at the Deepwater
Horizon drilling platform killed 11 people, unleashed
an environmental catastrophe in the Gulf region, and
adversely impacted the Gulf economy. Initial investi-
gations quickly focused on the failure of the “blowout
preventer” (BOP). The BOP is a large mechanism con-
sisting of a series of high-pressure hydraulic valves
designed to stop any uncontrolled flow of oil and gas
from the well. Given the extreme pressures at the
depth in question, preventing an uncontrolled flow or
surge is of critical importance. As the pressure built
and the BOP was engaged, the blind sheer ram (which
uses two blades to cut through the metal pipe and seal
the wellbore) failed. It is worth noting that the relia-
bility of blind-sheer rams had been repeatedly ques-
tioned and deemed insufficient by a number of studies
and tests conducted over the past decade.19 However,
failed equipment is not the story of this disaster.
In the hours before the explosion, the crew at
Deepwater Horizon had various and serious warning
signs before the well finally exploded. The well was
about to be sealed as per normal procedure as the
drilling contractor (Transoceanic) had completed its
work. BP was eager for them to complete their job
given costs to BP of about a $1 million a day. The nor-
mal procedure would be to remove the heavy drilling
lubricants and to replace them with lighter fluid
before sealing the well off until BP was ready to
extract the oil.
According to a House Energy and Commerce
Committee report issued a month after the explosion,
crews noticed unusual pressure and fluid readings
that should have alerted them.20 Removing the heav-
ier drilling fluids was counter-indicated by these
readings. There was also concern about evidence of
possible damage to the BOP. BP executives and top
drill hands debated how to proceed in the face of the
mounting warning signs. Over the objection of the
rig’s chief mechanic who was worried about the BOP
which he believed to have been damaged and seriously
compromised, a BP executive ordered the removal of
the heavy fluid and its replacement with lighter weight
sea water as per normal procedure. Five hours before
the explosion, an unexpected loss of fluid was observed,
thus suggesting that there were leaks in the BOP;
this was a reckless decision to say the least.20 In the
face of what was known on the night of April 20, and
in spite of obvious warnings, decisions were made to
ignore safety and to proceed. One would suspect the
basic decision was that it was worth rolling the dice
to cut costs.21
One might expect that given the risks associated
with drilling thousands of feet below the surface, the
federal regulators would take extra care to insure
that BP, a company with a corporate culture of cost
cutting where safety is concerned,17 would take all
necessary precautions to guard against cutting cor-
ners on safety. However, as we shall see, this was not
the case.
Oil companies generally create their own offshore
safety rules. They also enjoy various protections that
discourage the sharing of best practice in safety proce-
dures or the safety technologies they have developed.
This is more or less the case internationally. The US
government is not alone in ceding responsibility to the
oil industry for the design and implementation of
safety features on offshore rigs. This trend may come
into question in the aftermath of the blowout in the
Gulf.22 Beyond a general lack of safety regulation and
the reliance on oil producers to self-regulate and invent
the appropriate safety technology, it appears that the
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US governmental agency with oversight responsibility
for offshore drilling systematically failed to meet any
minimal expectations of professional responsibility.
The Minerals Management Service (MMS), a
bureau within the Department of Interior, was charged
with the responsibility of monitoring the development
of energy and mineral resources in the federal waters
off the US shores. They were responsible for oversight
and inspection of drilling sites in federal waters. MMS
was found to have a culture of lax oversight and exces-
sively close ties with the oil industry. Reports of ethi-
cal lapses going back many years by MMS included
the acceptance of gifts from the industry, accounting
inaccuracies, being under the influence of illegal sub-
stances while on the job, improper sexual relations
between industry representatives and representatives
on the leasing and inspection staff in a Gulf region
office in Louisiana, falsification of inspection documents,
and a history of inadequate performance of oversight
functions generally.23 These documented reports led to
the disbanding of MMS in the aftermath of Deepwater
Horizon and the division of its work among three
other bureaus.
From an ethical perspective, given the practice of
self-regulation by an industry with a long history of
failing to invest in safety combined with inadequate
oversight by an agency guilty of violating even the
most basic code of professional ethics, we have a perfect
storm. The introduction of prohibited risk is made
inevitable as are threats to the life and vitality of a
population that relies on decision makers (public and
private) to protect them against or reduce the risk of
disasters that are predictable and avoidable.
Knowledge is placed not in the service of broader val-
ues but is skewed in the service of more narrow eco-
nomic and individual interests. Decision makers all too
routinely avoid the task of applying knowledge to the
task of risk reduction. Ethical arbitrariness is not only
tolerated but is also invited in the absence of knowl-
edge as the necessary precondition for ethical choice.
This becomes even more problematic in the response
phase of a disaster such as Deepwater Horizon.
An examination of the immediate response to any
oil spill or blowout disaster often reveals a tragic trail
of ethical lapses. It might be suggested that what
ensues in the immediate aftermath of a disaster
amounts to a sort of response theater. In efforts to
contain the damage to the company image, to contain
any negative political fallout, and to limit legal liabil-
ity to whatever degree possible, oil companies and
their executives and political protectors follow a
script of sorts. Its main features are as follows:
 Understate the amount of oil spilled or
released (this entails controlling access
and delaying or preventing independent
analysis).
 Understate the environmental impact of
the disaster.
 Overstate the effectiveness of the com-
pany’s response (ultimate success is assured
even as long-term impacts are denied or
obscured).
 Try to buy off the locals (eg, offer money to
locals impacted in exchange for waivers
promising not to sue for damages).
 Slap gag orders on anyone doing busi-
ness with the corporation (especially
cleanup workers hired during the response
phase who must be kept away from the
media).
 Understate any health risks posed to
cleanup workers or locals by things such
as chemical dispersants or exposure to the
oil itself.
 Seek to spread the blame to someone else
(partners, nature, act of God, etc).
 Mount a massive PR campaign to reassure
the public and to control the damage to the
corporate image.
The response theater script does not work per-
fectly in achieving all of its goals, especially in major
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events where initial coverage is intense and public
perceptions are difficult to control; however, it works
well enough in several major respects to be pre-
dictably employed by the oil industry. The first goal of
the oil company, of course, is to protect itself against
any charges of negligence or misconduct. Union Oil,
in the aftermath of the Santa Barbara blowout of
1969, was reasonably successful in redefining the
sparsely covered event. Its strategy of redefinition
first blamed the disaster on nature (ie, beyond human
control) and secondly claimed that the disaster was a
minor and insignificant event.24 Exxon, following the
Valdez spill of 1989, waged a massive public relations
campaign to minimize the impact of the event. They
sought to convey that the spill was not very serious,
blamed perceived snags in the immediate response or
cleanup on the Coast Guard and the state of Alaska,
and sought against all evidence to the contrary to por-
tray the spill as resulting not from human error or
negligence but, more or less, as an act of God.25 These
efforts by Exxon failed as far as public relations are
concerned, but were deemed necessary and somewhat
effective as a part of a legal strategy to minimize risk
to the corporation in the face of inevitable law suits.
BP sought, as an early part of its strategy, to evade
responsibility and to spread the blame for the Deepwater
Horizon explosion to Transoceanic (the company which
owned and operated the drilling platform) and
Halliburton (the manufacturer of the complicated
safety equipment) and to shift the focus away from any
discussion of miscalculations on its part.17 In addition,
it appears to have intentionally underestimated the
amount of oil gushing into the Gulf. On April 24, BP
announced that only 1,000 barrels per day were leaking
into the Gulf. On April 28, the estimate was raised to
5,000 barrels per day. The estimate continued to creep
upward to 12,000 barrels per day, to 19,000 barrels per
day, to 35,000, and by mid June to 60,000 barrels per
day.26 The estimates began to increase only after the
public was allowed to view the underwater camera BP
had trained on the site. Initially, BP released only short
periods of video from limited angles and they allowed
no external expert analysis of the flow. When Congress
finally forced broader and unrestricted viewing, BP’s
estimates increased as independent experts began to
disprove the earlier lowball estimates.26 The changing
estimates clearly suggest that BP’s original estimates
may have been a part of an intentional effort to control
information and to minimize public perception of the
damage.
In both the immediate and the long-term
response to a disaster, oil companies remain fixated
on legal liability. Their number one concern is the dis-
aster’s impact on management, employees, and share-
holders. This may be understandable, perhaps logical.
Company lawyers would be negligent if they did not
advise their clients to take all steps necessary to
avoid legal liabilities. However, this almost guaran-
tees that the ethical concerns associated with the pre-
vention of risk and the reduction of harm will not be
effectively addressed. Knowledge is not applied to
serve values associated with public safety.
In both the predisaster and postdisaster phases,
knowledge is not directed toward the meeting of eth-
ical responsibilities. The skewing of knowledge, choos-
ing to ignore or distort what is known in the interest
of cost reduction (predisaster) or in an effort to evade
legal liability or negative outcomes for the company
(postdisaster) are the apparent industry norms. This
leads to the lack or absence of knowledge, which is the
driving force for decision making. It is a condition
that renders ethical decision making impossible
because even if there is an articulated intention to
promote the value of public safety, the ethical choice
cannot be made without the application of the very
knowledge being controlled, skewed, or ignored in the
pursuit of other values.
The unavailability of knowledge by choice, which
most aptly applies to much of what has been
described in our discussion in this section, reduces
and may even eliminate the possibility for ethical
choices by decision makers. As noted in our ethical
theory, knowledge is a precondition for ethical choice.
It does not guarantee ethical outcomes, but its absence
almost always works against them. This is the essen-
tial problem that must be resolved if public and pri-
vate decision makers wish to arrive at ethically sound
decisions. It is not a problem that can be easily solved,
but there may be some practical steps that can move
this process forward.
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KNOWLEDGE AS AN ETHICAL IMPERATIVE: FOUR PRINCIPLES
Our quick glimpse at the behavior of BP and other
oil companies in various disaster settings indicates
that corporate responsibility is often frustrated by a
recurring cycle of decisions that work against the
application of knowledge to the tasks of risk reduction
and safety as a first priority. Management incentives
and rewards are not centered on safety or ethical deci-
sion making, and this is reflected in both the cutting
of corners on cost before an event and the lack of
transparency and openness during and after a crisis
event. The examples discussed herein suggest that
there is a corporate culture that often works against
consistently thoughtful and responsible decision mak-
ing about safety and risk reduction. The relatively
weak oversight of the oil industry by regulatory bodies
and the apparent reluctance of public policy makers to
regulate the industry have only compounded the risks
taken and the costs of unethical choices.
Moving forward, there must be a clearer sense of
ethical priorities and clearly articulated values to
guide private and public decision making. The appli-
cation of the ethical theory with which this analysis
began to the important tasks of risk reduction and
public safety requires some basic principles to be
identified and some critical steps to be taken. Several
principles suggest themselves as logical starting
points for guiding any subsequent action. These prin-
ciples, along with the several action steps mentioned
as examples in the discussion to follow, are meant to
serve as a foundation for a much needed long-term
analysis and discussion as the focusing event known
as the BP disaster in the Gulf retreats from immedi-
acy and becomes a vaguely remembered incident.
Elevation of the prohibited risk principle
In conjunction with the basic human rights argu-
ment, we have reported that risk is prohibited when
the potential harm is a threat to life and vitality. This
means that the risk is undetectable by potential vic-
tims who must rely on the expertise of others (public
and private decision makers) to be protected, the
harms are predictable, and there are known methods
for the reduction of risks. Beyond this general state-
ment of principle, public policy makers must articulate
precisely which risks we as a people will prohibit and
which we will accept. One would suggest that this
question should be a critical component in any legisla-
tive initiative to assess the BP disaster and/or to craft
enhanced regulations for safety.
All risks are typically calculated and applied to
planning for and mitigation against predictable disas-
ter impacts. In the context of the ethical theory devel-
oped in the emergency management literature, risks
defined as “unacceptable” must be “prohibited,” and all
other risks must be managed and incorporated into
preparedness planning. In addition to informing any
subsequent governmental regulation, this perspective
must be integrated into the training of public and cor-
porate decision makers. The ethical responsibility to
avoid the introduction of prohibited risks must be
made clear and not just in the context of legal liability
as seems to be the case presently. Likewise, the ethical
responsibility to reduce all other risks and to invest in
safety should be emphasized as an ethical responsibil-
ity and not merely as a legal one. The prohibited risk
principle must be elevated and defined as a first prior-
ity, and overall risk reduction must also be stressed for
all public and private decision makers. This is easier
said than done; however, the emphasis of this priority
in our political discourse and in the formal education
and training of decision makers would seem to be an
appropriate place to begin.
Improved risk assessment independently verified
Risk assessment is the basic first step in prepar-
ing for any disaster. In most cases, knowledge about
present situations, the ability to predict potential
risks or harms, and the capacity to develop responses
that anticipate future outcomes and to reduce the
risks and impacts of a disaster are all possible. This
does not routinely happen when oil companies or
politicians assess risks (they all too often underesti-
mate them) unchecked. To the degree possible, risk
assessments related to oil exploration (especially deep
water drilling) should be subjected to an independent
expert review and held to the strictest safety stan-
dards. Regulatory bodies with industry ties and politi-
cians seeking oil state money and votes have proven
inadequate in the past.
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Given the number of times we have noted a lax
attitude toward investment in safety and the propen-
sity to elevate cost cutting to the level of highest pri-
ority in our narrative, it is not unreasonable to sug-
gest that policymakers take steps to enhance risk
assessment and insure that it guides decision mak-
ers. This ideally can be done in a proper regulatory
environment, and lawmakers should be expected to
devote some time and attention to addressing the
need for that. More ideally, in light of past oversight
failures, one is tempted to recommend the creation of
a nonindustrial and nongovernmental panel of inde-
pendent experts to verify the accuracy of risk assess-
ments and to do so in a transparent manner that will
be available for public review. This might include the
recommendation of appropriate baseline safety proce-
dures and technical guidelines for safety prepared-
ness efforts. Whatever is the mechanism, it is criti-
cally important that the knowledge developed during
risk assessment be applied to planning for safety and
disaster preparedness planning.
Verification of safety preparedness
With the development of reliable risk assess-
ments based on adequate scientific, technical, and
predictive knowledge, companies must have an incen-
tive to make adequate provisions for safety and disas-
ter preparedness before proceeding with new drilling
sites. The application of knowledge to these efforts
must be guaranteed by independent verification of
safety and disaster response plans. Policy makers
may want to craft regulations to specify that such
plans be developed, verified by expert review, and put
in place before work may begin on a new site.
One understands that the verification of safety
preparedness can be difficult and that oil companies
in particular may be reluctant to share best practices
and any new technologies they have developed. Yet,
given the repeated indications that investment in
safety lags far behind the investment in new technolo-
gies that expand risks related to deepwater explo-
ration, it is again not unreasonable to be more proac-
tive in holding the industry accountable. It is common
in many technological fields to be transparent in the
discussion of safety and in the sharing of tools and
techniques for risk assessment and safety design.
Establishing requirements to design safety or risk
reduction plans, to verify and demonstrate the relia-
bility of these plans, to execute the plans, and to docu-
ment the implementation of the plans is a professional
norm in many technological fields and should be made
a stricter requirement and more tightly enforced than
has previously been the case with respect to offshore
oil exploration.
Incident response transparency
Responding to an incident is (to the degree it is
reliant on the technology and expertise of a generally
self regulated industry) subject to manipulation by
the oil industry. Our assessment of what we have
called the response theater demonstrates that it is
probably a mistake to rely on the industry for accu-
rate information or openness with respect to the
assessment of damages, the calculation of long term
impacts, the assessment of ecological damage, or the
assessment of health risks to an impacted population
or cleanup workers.
In the interest of promoting ethical decision mak-
ing in the response phase, it is imperative that the
response to a disaster or incident be transparent and
that there be a reliable assessment by independent
experts to calculate damage and to evaluate any risks
posed by response techniques (such as the introduction
of chemical dispersants) or the application of technical
fixes. Appropriate steps must be designed to provide
appropriate independent expertise to have access and
to be applied so that corporate leaders or governmen-
tal actors may not obstruct independent and accurate
analysis or skew the perception of a disaster event to
cover corporate or governmental negligence.
The application of knowledge to risk reduction and
harm prevention is especially critical in response sce-
narios for response workers and impacted populations.
Their safety and health may be compromised if deci-
sions in the response phase of the disaster or incident
are not based on the best predictive knowledge.
Openness is also critical so that the requirement is met
that we learn everything we can from each disaster
event and apply the knowledge gained to future risk
reduction decisions in general.
Journal of Emergency Management
Vol. 9, No. 3, May/June 2011
20
CONCLUSIONS
Given the importance we have assigned to knowl-
edge in relation to ethics in industrial and technologi-
cal settings, it should be considered as the moral
imperative for all decision making. It is the necessary
foundation or precondition for ethical choice, and it
should be applied without compromise to risk reduc-
tion and safety. The ethical theory discussed in this
analysis establishes that the application of the best
technical knowledge, the ability to identify risks and to
predict outcomes, the sharing of expertise and informa-
tion, and the making of ethical choices must be con-
nected first and foremost to the fundamental purposes
of preventing prohibited risks that pose unacceptable
threats to life and safety and to the reduction of all
other risks that may be identified. This must be the
first principle that animates all decision makers. As
the knowledge base is expanded in relation to the tech-
nologies associated with oil exploration and the risks
they impose, there must be an equal or greater expan-
sion of ethical analysis and risk reduction.
The common behaviors and practices we have
gleaned from Deepwater Horizon and several other
well-known disaster incidents demonstrates that deci-
sion makers all too frequently discount, underesti-
mate, or ignore what is known or knowable in pursuit
of what they perceive to be some greater or more com-
pelling political or economic value. In assessing the
ethical implications of these decisions, it becomes
clear that they often compromise what our ethical the-
ory suggests is required for the tasks associated with
risk reduction and public safety. The four principles
we have discussed as a foundation for long-term dis-
cussion and analysis represent a means of refocusing
our attention on the importance of ethical decision
making as an essential ingredient in the reduction of
risk and the meeting of responsibilities to the public.
In the industrial world, as we have seen in our
brief discussion of the oil industry, there is a need for
knowledge in relation to the ethical responsibilities
that flow from the ever-increasing possibility that we
may inflict great and unacceptable risks on our fellow
citizens and the communities in which they work and
live. It may be true that to achieve great and mighty
deeds, we must be willing to take greater risks, but it
also follows that with greater risks come greater
responsibilities. The BP disaster is quickly receding
from our minds and any lessons learned from it are
illusive with its quick retreat from our immediate
attention. The analysis and concluding suggestions
made herein are aimed at stimulating renewed think-
ing and long-term analysis about the meeting of the
greater responsibilities that come with great and
mighty deeds. This may be the only hope we have of
preventing the next disaster.
Robert O. Schneider, PhD, Department of Public Administration,
University of North Carolina at Pembroke, Pembroke, North Carolina.
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